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Outsourcing, Supplier Relations, and the External Span of Control 
 
Abstract 
The  outsourcing  and  supplier  relations  literature  focuses  primarily  on  initial  designs  while 
ignoring how superior implementation skills can drive competitive advantage. The concept of 
external span of control, defined as a firm’s overall capability to manage multiple and varying 
relations  with  outside  suppliers,  is  put  forward  to  capture  implementation  differences.  Its 
antecedents  are  described  and  strategies  are  provided  for  improving  it  involving  growth, 
alignment, internal development, and inter-firm learning.   3 
The common theme in the literature on outsourcing and supplier relations is how many and which 
activities  firms  should  outsource  and  what  subsequently  makes  for  an  effective  governance 
design  of  buyer-supplier  relations.  As  an  empirical  phenomenon  outsourcing  has  become  an 
important  strategy  for  firms  to  alter  their  cost  base  and  potentially  obtain  new  competitive 
advantage. Conceptually it has also drawn substantial attention. The make-or-buy decision is a 
standard area of application for transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991). Under conditions 
of low asset specificity and low uncertainty, it pays off to outsource components or services 
(Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Leiblein, Reuer and D’Alsace, 2002). In addition, recent work from 
the  resource-based  perspective  suggests  that  firm  capabilities  also  influence  the  make-or-buy 
decision in that having capabilities in a certain area promotes internalization of the underlying 
activities (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Barney, 1999; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). It is now generally 
recognized that quasi-integrated or partnering relations with external suppliers can sometimes be 
a  useful  alternative  to  vertical  integration  even  in  conditions  of  high  asset  specificity 
(Nooteboom, 1999) or high uncertainty (Gulati, 1995). Asset specificity may not create problems 
of  opportunism  when  constructions  can  be  found  that  create  mutual  commitment  (like  the 
keiretsu structure, see Dyer, 1996) and joint investment occurs (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Similarly 
the trust mechanism can act as a substitute to certainty in cases of high uncertainty (Luhmann, 
1968) as it allows decision makers to replace actual knowledge about future events with a very 
strong belief that presumed knowledge about future events is correct. Under conditions of strong 
technological  innovation  and  when  highly  specific  technologies  are  developed,  there  are 
incentives for firms to outsource to single-source suppliers (Barney, 1999; Brusoni, Prencipe and 
Pavitt, 2001). Thus it makes sense that we see much outsourcing, sometimes even in areas crucial 
to the firm’s future competitive advantage because partnership relations with external suppliers 
can become an effective substitute for vertical integration. I will loosely refer to this area of   4 
existing literature as the outsourcing design approach, a term that is not intended to reflect a 
specific theoretical angle but rather its focus. 
While I do not wish to contend that the outsourcing design approach as such is faulty, it 
fails to shed light on the question why there is inter-firm performance heterogeneity when firms 
operating under similar  circumstances have  chosen a similar design. Apparently the eventual 
effectiveness  of  a  design  is  not  merely  determined  by  its  characteristics  but  also  by  the 
characteristics of the adopter of the design. Toyota’s supplier network is perhaps the most widely 
publicized of any firm. As such its design is fairly well understood. Through intensive relations 
with  suppliers  Toyota  manages  to  create  new  knowledge  and  to  distribute  that  knowledge 
throughout the value chain (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Lincoln, Ahmadjian, and Mason, 1998). 
There are various micro level mechanisms in place for joint learning (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). 
In addition its supplier network is flexible and robust enough to deal with calamities should these 
arise  (Nishiguchi  and  Beaudet,  1998).  When  Chrysler,  however,  tried  to  emanate  Toyota’s 
practices it encountered various obstacles, including the difficulty of creating equity ties with 
suppliers and the lack of job rotation between itself and supplier companies (Dyer, 1996). Even 
other Japanese carmakers, like Nissan, are not able to create exact copies of the Toyota system, 
for instance because they cannot establish ties with suppliers that already produce exclusively for 
Toyota (Lincoln et al., 1998). Thus while firms may have knowledge of an effective design and 
are willing to implement it, they may eventually not be equally effective in using it. 
There are various potential explanations for this phenomenon. One that seems to by-and-
large have been overlooked is that the implementation phase that lies between a design and its 
eventual effectiveness outcomes, may also be a variance creating source. In other words, some 
firms are better at implementing a given design under given circumstances than others. In view of 
these observations the central research question that motivates this paper is What are the causes   5 
of  inter-firm  differences  in  sourcing  effectiveness  that  emerge  during  the  implementation  of 
similar governance designs? 
To derive an answer to this question the next section is used to analyze outsourcing and 
supplier relations as they have been discussed in recent literature. This review proves the point 
that implementation issues have mostly been neglected.  In an effort to fill this gap the term 
external span of control is then introduced to capture inter-firm differences in the implementation 
of  designs.  I  subsequently  review  three  approaches  that  may  help  us  understand  how  these 
differences emerge. Building upon that overview the next section discusses how the external span 
of control is influenced by various intra-firm and inter-firm mechanisms and how differences in 
implementation ability eventually lead to differences in sourcing effectiveness. In the concluding 
section  I  discuss  issues  of  measurement  and  point  out  several  interesting  avenues  for  future 
research. 
 
OUTSOURCING AND SUPPLIER RELATIONS 
Delineating the Topic 
Before extending the discussion on outsourcing and supplier relations, it is important to clarify 
what these terms encompass. By outsourcing I will refer to any service or good that is procured 
from independent legal entities, henceforth referred to as suppliers. Other definitions in use focus 
on  the  process  of  outsourcing  goods  or  services  that  were  previously  produced  in-house,  on 
specific types of outsourcing (like IT outsourcing), or on goods or services that are procured on 
specification from external suppliers but could equally well be produced in-house. While these 
definitions have their own merits, the broadest available definition has been chosen, primarily in 
order to be able to include and discuss all types of supplier relations. Supplier relations then, refer   6 
to the whole range of potential relations from arm’s length through to strongly cooperative or 
partnership relations. In this context it is useful to note that the entirety of a firm’s supplier 
relations  can  be  conceived  of  as  a  portfolio  (Dyer,  Chu  and  Cho,  1998)  in  which  a  mix  of 
relations exists. While some supplier relations in a portfolio will be of the partnership type, a firm 
will simultaneously have a set of arm’s length relations. 
Over the 1980s and 1990s and into the new millennium much has changed in the supply 
chain management of firms. Three major changes stand out above anything else. First, firms in 
the U.S. and elsewhere have increasingly outsourced components, services and entire business 
processes to third parties in an effort to benefit from increased focus on core activities and to 
lower production costs (Domberger, 1998; Quinn, 1999). As outsourcing increases, so does its 
potential  to  contribute  to  a  firm’s  sustainable  competitive  advantage.  Hence  outsourcing  has 
drawn substantial attention in the literature, though by far not as much as in practice (Doig, 
Ritter, Speckhals and Woolson, 2001). Among practitioners it is now sometimes suggested firms 
may have been outsourcing more than they should or at least more than they can practically 
manage (Doig et  al., 2001). Second, the relations with these outside suppliers have in many 
instances  changed  towards  more  long-term,  single  source  relations,  often  based  on  trust,  to 
replace price-driven adversarial relations (Helper and Sako, 1995). This has been accompanied 
by an increasing rationalization of the supply base through single-source relations in an effort to 
increase the scale of purchased volumes from a particular supplier and promote standardization. 
In effect firms have to some extent been trading a large number of and a wide choice between 
suppliers for dedicated relations with a much smaller number of suppliers. Finally, an increasing 
tendency has been documented to replace domestic outsourcing with international outsourcing 
(Swamidass and Kotabe, 1994). The use of foreign suppliers on the one hand opens up a wider 
potential supply base with the associated lower production costs, yet also induces cultural and   7 
institutional  differences  that  raise  the  costs  of  coordinating  transactions.  Thus  international 
outsourcing poses firms with new dilemmas. 
Outsourcing has been a prominent business strategy in many areas but recently perhaps 
the most important areas of change are manufacturing (Kotabe, 1998) and IT services (Poppo and 
Zenger,  1998),  now  extending  into  business  processes  and  offshoring.  Former  manufacturing 
firms like Nike now have very limited manufacturing operations and rely heavily on a network of 
outside suppliers. One potential drawback of such a strategy is that a lack of manufacturing and 
engineering knowledge may pose limits to innovation and hence a competitive disadvantage in 
the  long  run  (Kotabe,  1998).  Other  firms  have  focused  on  reducing  supplier  numbers  while 
increasing  coordination  of  activities  with  the  remaining  suppliers.  Ford  Motor  Company,  for 
instance, reduced its number of suppliers for a single model from over 700 to 227 during its 
World Car project while simultaneously increasing collaborative engineering efforts. Such supply 
base rationalization has lowered the costs of coordinating supplier relations. In IT services firms 
like EDS have benefited from the outsourcing of entire IT departments by banks, manufacturing 
firms,  and  other  service  firms.  While  the  changed  nature  of  relations  with  these  IT  vendors 
involves more cooperation, it has also induced more detailed contracts, for instance in the form of 
Service Level Agreements (Poppo and Zenger, 1998). As such, trust and cooperation are perhaps 
best seen as complements to contracts, rather than their substitutes. 
In some discussions on outsourcing and supplier relations the important links between 
them tend to be overlooked, even though outsourcing and management of supplier relations are 
mutually  dependent  issues  (Takeishi,  2001).  When  firms  outsource  additional  activities  this 
obviously automatically induces a new or expanded supplier relation. Vice versa the insourcing, 
which implies taking in-house, of an activity involves the termination or shrinking of an existing 
supplier relation. Both can be lengthy and painstaking processes with severe implications for   8 
organizations and their constituents. Whether or not to outsource an activity and how to design a 
relation with a supplier once it is decided to outsource an activity are simultaneous decisions and 
should  preferably  be  treated  as  such.  A  conceptual  separation  of  the  two  topics  is  therefore 
unwarranted and I will discuss them in conjunction. 
  As a final point of clarification the term governance design as it was used in the research 
question will here be taken to imply both the choice for an in-house or external provider, the 
outsourcing decision, and the choice for a type of relation somewhere on the continuum between 
arm’s  length  and  partnership,  the  relation  design  decision.  A  strong  logic  for  this  has  been 
provided  by  Hennart’s  (1993)  often  overlooked  notion  that  almost  all  (supply)  relations 
incorporate  elements  of  both  the  price  mechanism  and  the  authority  mechanism.  As  such, 
insourcing features at least some price incentives while outsourcing is at least partly steered by 
hierarchical  elements.  Almost  all  governance  designs,  then,  are  a  mix  of  modes  in  reality 
(Hennart, 1993). In effect then, governance design has a quantitative dimension, the number of 
external relations, as well as a qualitative dimension, the strength of these relations. 
 
Stock of Knowledge 
Scholarly research on outsourcing and supplier relations has focused primarily on the question 
what the appropriate or most effective governance design is given the nature of the transaction or 
situation at stake. Transaction cost economics explanations have been the most prominent vehicle 
in answering this question (Leiblein et al., 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Williamson, 1991). By 
focusing on transaction characteristics, we have been able to uncover a large part of the variance 
in make-or-buy decision-making. Despite its strengths there are limitations to this approach that 
have caused scholars to seek additional explanations. One limitation of TCE in make-or-buy 
decisions is its failure to incorporate firm level variables, like heterogeneity in firm resources, in   9 
its explanation. This is particularly bothersome  in dynamic industries or industries otherwise 
characterized  by  large  differences  in  resource  endowments  (Barney,  1999).  Resource-based 
explanations (Barney, 1999) take these inter-firm differences as a starting point and therefore 
excel at explaining heterogeneity between firms. Leiblein and Miller (2003) demonstrated in the 
context  of  semi-conductor  production  that  firm-level  explanations  complement  transactional 
characteristics. An applied version of the resource-based view, in the form of a competence-based 
view,  has  also  been  presented  and  basically  argues  that  all  non-core  activities  should  be 
outsourced to best-in-world suppliers (Quinn, 1999). Other approaches for make-or-buy decisions 
include agency theory and measurement approaches (Poppo and Zenger, 1998), which have been 
particularly popular in economics (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1987). Both suggest that there is an 
optimal outsourcing strategy given the information available to decision-makers, even though 
firms may regularly have to modulate between make and buy forms if they wish to reap the 
benefits of both (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002). On supplier relations, an even wider array of 
approaches  has  been  tried,  since  micro-economic  modeling  has  been  complemented  by 
(economic) sociology here. TCE suggests arm’s length contracting should be used in cases of 
very low or negligible asset specificity, low uncertainty and low contracting frequency while the 
opposite circumstances call for vertical integration or relational contracting (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994). The competence-based approach has been used to argue that cooperative relations 
should  be  used  in  areas  close  to  the  firm’s  core  competences  (Quinn  and  Hilmer,  1994). 
Embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997) and trust (Gulati, 1995) approaches essentially argue that it is high 
uncertainty  that  calls  for  close  and  repetitive  ties  in  networked  settings.  The  relational  rent 
argument (Dyer and Singh, 1998) holds that partnering firms can over the long run develop joint 
routines  and  mechanisms  of  a  transaction  cost  minimizing  or  transaction  value  maximizing 
nature. One thing that these various approaches have in common though, is that all of them have   10 
tended to concentrate on analysis and governance design (Nooteboom, 1999), i.e. on the most 
appropriate sourcing mode or supplier relation. The conclusion Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 91) 
drew on interorganizational relations apparently still holds for both IORs in the form of supplier 
relations and outsourcing decisions: “most of the research to date has been focused either on the 
antecedent  conditions  or  the  structural  properties  of  interorganizational  relationships  in 
comparison with other governance forms”. 
Yet there is empirical evidence to suggest superior designs do not by definition lead to 
effective outcomes. Nissan unsuccessfully tried to emulate Toyota’s outsourcing and supplier 
relations approach for decades. Eventually this  lack of success led to the partial takeover of 
Nissan by Renault. Media sources attributed some of the failure to differences in the background 
of Nissan top management, who were lawyers from top Tokyo schools, compared to Toyota 
executives that invariably had some engineering knowledge and were more practical and down-
to-earth, a much-needed characteristic when it comes to day-to-day exchanges with suppliers. 
Thus Nissan was not well-equipped to copy the Toyota strategy. Similarly, when the British 
national rail operator Network Rail, formerly Railtrack, was privatized, it decided to outsource 
maintenance activities through long-term contracts with a number of independent contractors, 
which were to be closely monitored. Such a scheme had been successful for other public transit 
systems, for instance in the US and Australia (Domberger, 1998). One of these contractors was 
Jarvis, a company that came under heavy scrutiny in 2002 and 2003 over its involvement in a 
number of railroad accidents, including one in Potter’s Bar which took seven lives. Even after 
that particular incident additional mistakes occurred involving Jarvis, among them a derailment at 
London’s busy Kings Cross station. British media blamed this on Railtrack’s inability to manage 
relations with independent suppliers properly, a problem its successor Network Rail inherited. As   11 
a  consequence  Network  Rail  decided  to  gradually  insource  maintenance  activities.  Jarvis 
transferred its rail maintenance activities to Network Rail in October of 2003. 
Both  examples  show  that  outsourcing  and  supplier  designs  that  work  well  for  one 
organization need not be appropriate for another organization, even one operating under similar 
circumstances. In addition they demonstrate that a mere design by itself does not lead to success 
but that a successful implementation trajectory is equally important. Design-based approaches 
would  use  the  header  of  coordination  costs  (Hendry,  1995;  Nooteboom,  1999)  to  cover  the 
investment  of  time  and  resources  in  control  mechanisms  to  manage  external  relations.  That, 
however, tells us little about how these coordination costs occur and even less about how they 
may  differ  from  one  organization  to  the  next.  This  is  a  problem  more  generally  with  the 
outsourcing  design  approach:  if  we  can  say  what  the  best  design  is  under  a  given  set  of 
circumstances, there is no way an organization can create competitive advantage based on such 
designs,  unless  the  implementation  phase  generates  such  advantages  or  managers  decide  to 
deviate from the best design. We have learned a great deal by focusing on governance design yet 
a different focus is now needed if we wish to substantially increase our understanding of the 
relation between outsourcing, supplier relations, and performance. The end of the learning curve 
may  be  nearing  for  design-based  studies,  particularly  as  they  have  already  been  extended  to 
include services (Murray  and Kotabe, 1999) and  IT (Poppo and  Zenger, 1998).  It is hard to 
foresee  much  conceptual  improvement  in  designs  based  on  the  stock  of  underlying  theories 
currently available. One alternative is to discuss why firms decide on designs that are not optimal. 
Why do some firms outsource more than they ought to? The answer to this question exceeds the 
scope of this paper but could for instance involve issues of bandwagoning, managerial ignorance, 
and causal ambiguity. Another option is to discuss the process dimensions of building supplier 
relations, as Ring and Van de Ven (1994) chose to do, or those of outsourcing. Here, however, I   12 
will  proceed  to  outline  more  generally  how  implementation  may  affect  the  effectiveness  of 




Explaining Additional Heterogeneity 
If  we  wish  to  uncover  additional  heterogeneity  I  propose  we  have  to  study  varying 
abilities  of  organizations  to  implement  and  manage  relations  with  outside  suppliers  to  their 
benefit. In this paper the term external span of control is used to cover such varying abilities. 
More precisely the external span of control is defined as a firm’s overall capability to manage 
multiple and varying relations with outside suppliers. Henri Fayol (1949) first introduced the 
notion of a manager’s span of control in 1916. He referred to it as the number of workers a single 
manager can usefully manage. The fact that a single manager can control multiple but not an 
unlimited number of workers has led to the classical, multiple-layered, pyramid-like organization 
structure, which we so commonly associate with the word hierarchy. For a long time this even 
dominated the thinking on organizational models, perhaps until the work on matrix organizations. 
It  is  now  recognized  that  firms  cannot  add  unlimited  levels  to  their  hierarchies  since 
diseconomies of scale arise as a consequence of communication difficulties when crossing many 
levels. If one thinks of suppliers as workers and the firm as a manager of its external suppliers, 
the metaphor is clear. Beyond the metaphoric though, it is equally true that firms cannot manage 
endless  numbers  of  suppliers.  Interestingly  enough,  and  similar  to  the  classical  organization 
structure, firms have also started structuring their supply relationships in a pyramid-like model in 
                                                            
1  It  has  been  suggested  that  academically  speaking  implementation  is  the  black  sheep  of  the  strategy  family 
(Hambrick,  2004).  Hambrick  (2004)  even  suggests  this  lack  of  attention  is  one  of  the  causes  underlying 
disintegration of the strategy field. While strategy analysis and design have received ample attention, implementation 
is  more  concerned  with  the  human  side  of  strategy  and  therefore  perhaps  less  rational  and  more  idiosyncratic,   13 
what is called tiering of suppliers. The Japanese Keiretsu supply system perhaps best exemplifies 
this development. This raises the question to what extent sourcing managers do indeed face span 
of  control  problems  in  supplier  relations.  Practical  experience  shows  that  they  are  making 
continuous  trade-offs  when  implementing  their  sourcing  strategies  (Hendry,  1995).  A  firm’s 
managers do not have unlimited time and resources available to execute whatever design best fits 
their firms. Thus they face constant pressures to invest time and efforts in either this or that 
supplier relation. Decision-making will be of a heuristic nature because (Simon, 1998: 119):  
“Administrators (and everyone else for that matter) take into account just a few of the 
factors of the situation regarded as most relevant and crucial. In particular, they deal 
with one or a few problems at a time, because the limits on attention simply don’t 
permit everything to be attended to at once.” 
Bounded rationality does not only affect whether the best possible designs can be found but also 
how these are effectuated. Firms cannot succeed in maximizing the transaction value of every 
relation.  And  there  is  a  transaction  cost  attached  to  each  supplier  relation  a  firm  wishes  to 
maintain and therefore adding suppliers increases overall transaction costs and reduces the efforts 
spent on an individual relation. As the complexity of the supplier network increases coordination 
costs will increase exponentially. In addition to these firm level restrictions there are cognitive 
limits to the number of suppliers individual managers can deal with. Thus there is a definite upper 
limit to the number of supply relations a firm can maintain. The literature, however, proposes a 
second limit that is related not to the quantity but rather to the quality of relations. It is found in 
the  concepts  of  weak  and  strong  ties  (Granovetter,  1985;  Uzzi,  1996).  When  distinguishing 
between strong and weak ties, firms and individuals alike are limited in their use of strong ties. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
impeding generalized analytic conclusions. This may explain the lack of scholarly investigations on implementation 
and on implementation of outsourcing and supplier relations in particular.   14 
Strong ties are distinguishable precisely because they are stronger than the average tie. In other 
words,  not  every  supplier  relation  can  be  of  a  cooperative  kind.  Rather,  firms  will  maintain 
portfolios of supplier relations with varying strengths (Dyer, Cho and Chu, 1998). 
  External span of control as discussed here is a firm level construct while Fayol’s original 
notion involved individuals. Clearly a level of analysis issue arises here and concept stretching 
must be avoided. In the area of outsourcing and supplier relations it is usually the firm to which 
relations are attributed and we speak of a firm ‘managing relations’ (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Helper and Sako, 1995). In the literal sense of the word this may be incorrect since it must be 
managers who manage and not firms but it is the practice that has arisen and an abstraction 
required  to  usefully  analyze  the  underlying  problems.  Surely  there  are  important  linkages 
between firm and individual level traits when it comes to dealing with outside parties (Zaheer, 
McEvily and Perrone, 1998). Managers make a firm’s decisions and execute those. A strong 
mutual understanding between key individuals at the buying and supplying firms can help in 
developing an inter-firm relation. In that sense it is important to realize the two levels of analysis 
operate conjointly. But given that we generally believe it is the firm that manages relations, the 
concept of external span of control becomes applicable to the firm too and given that it initially 
referred to the number of workers, it can also be applied to the number of suppliers. A second 
issue  is  whether  the  type  of  supplier  relations  should  be  included.  Follow-up  discussions  of 
Fayol’s work have pointed at the influence of external circumstances on the size of the span of 
control. A manager’s span of control depends among others on the task complexity of workers 
and their competence levels. Similarly there is much discrepancy amongst supplier relations. This 
generates differences in management requirements since managing four partnership relations will 
be quite different from managing four arm’s length relations. Therefore it is fair to include the 
type of relation when defining external span of control.   15 
Since the external span of control is defined as a firm’s overall capability to manage 
multiple  and  varying  relations  with  outside  suppliers,  it  is  interesting  to  see  what  impact 
heterogeneity in this capability may have on the firm’s performance. In the context of inter-firm 
relations, heterogeneity has so far mostly been presumed to be in the relation itself (e.g. Dyer and 
Singh,  1998)  and  not  in  how  it  is  managed  by  the  firm.  In  the  context  of  outsourcing, 
heterogeneity is seen to exist in the capabilities of the firm that influence the decision whether to 
make or buy (Barney, 1999) but not necessarily in whether some firms are inherently better or 
worse in managing outsourcing. I will now briefly discuss three streams of literature that shed 
more light on this matter. 
 
Competence Perspective 
Firm capabilities are thought to influence outsourcing decisions, particularly in industries where 
there is substantial change and ample room for strategic differentiation (Barney, 1999). Thus 
where there are differences between firms in terms of capabilities, this ought to be reflected 
across the range of outsourcing decisions they take. The extent of outsourcing will differ between 
firms in an industry just like it differs between industries. It has been suggested firms ought to 
focus  on  those  activities  in  which  they  excel  globally  and  outsource  all  other  activities  to 
suppliers who are the best providers in their respective areas (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Through 
such specialization economies of scale and scope may arise (Domberger, 1998), as suppliers will 
serve multiple customers and become highly effective at their particular task. 
In today’s knowledge economy it becomes increasingly important to properly execute 
functions  aimed  at  obtaining  knowledge  from  dispersed  external  sources  (Doz,  Santos,  and 
Williamson, 2000). Suppliers are a potentially important source of external knowledge, especially 
for technical development (Lincoln et al. 1998). In general, the more firms outsource, the more   16 
important  correct  information  from  suppliers  becomes.  However,  the  choice  what  particular 
source to pursue is often a difficult one given the abundance of potential targets all over the world 
(Doz et al., 2000). In fact, it is often only as managers engage in relations with suppliers that they 
find out which suppliers are particularly useful for this purpose, implying trial-and-error is a 
necessary step. In addition a trust-building process must occur, which is unpredictable in nature 
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Thus sourcing managers will find themselves investing much time 
in  setting  up  relations  with  suppliers  that  they  might  never  actually  use  for  knowledge 
accumulation purposes, similar to what Doz et al. (2000) refer to as the sensing stage. Therefore 
there is unpredictability over the pay-offs related to these investments. 
The  outsourcing  design  approach  holds  that  all  sourcing  managers  are  equally  well 
equipped for their jobs and unbiased. Both are doubtful as managers differ in their functional and 
educational backgrounds and training levels. More and better training should make for better 
decisions. Different backgrounds imply that decision-making outcomes will also differ. In the 
markets and hierarchies debate for instance, it has been noted (Dobbin and Baum, 2000) that 
economists  hold  more  faith  in  the  power  of  the  market,  while  sociologists  believe  in 
organizations. In fact economic explanations of organization start from the notion that a market 
must fail for an organization to become useful (Williamson, 1991), while sociological accounts of 
markets (Granovetter, 1985) tend to stress how many markets really are organizations in disguise. 
Managers trained in either of these traditions may well become biased towards either of the two 
defaults through isomorphistic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1984) or simply for a lack of 
knowing better, implying a manager’s training background or experience will directly feed into 
outsourcing decisions. Therefore different managers will approach decisions differently and more 
or less competently. Heterogeneity in competence levels is directly connected to heterogeneity in 
both outsourcing and supplier relations.   17 
  At the firm level different imprinting conditions (Stinchcombe, 1965), both temporally 
and spatially, will induce heterogeneity in what firms are good at and how good they are. Firms 
that first emerged during the rise of mass production are likely to apply different outsourcing and 
supplier  relations  models  from  those  that  emerged  during  recent  times  when  information 
technology had taken on much prominence. Although they may not necessarily be dinosaurs, 
firms with a longer tradition are not likely to immediately replace all existing relations by virtual 
ones  or  to  suddenly  outsource  all  hitherto  integrated  activities.  Similarly  there  are important 
differences spatially, with the home country providing crucial institutional and cultural sourcing 
practices. The Toyota discussion can again serve as an example that firms from some countries 
are  clearly  more  apt  at  creating  cooperative  relations,  although  that  does  not  imply  they  are 
necessarily better at managing all relational types. 
 
Learning Perspective 
The  key  distinction  in  the  learning  literature  is  between  exploration  and  exploitation 
(Levinthal and March, 1993), Despite their obvious potential for learning, supplier networks have 
not been studied extensively in terms of their potential for either type of learning (Lane, 2001). 
Lane (2001) discusses how firms can learn new technology, operational practices or competences 
in supply chain constellations. Yet there is another side to learning, outsourcing, and supplier 
relations, which is whether the firm can learn how to get more out of its outsourcing and supplier 
relations efforts. Internal learning on outsourcing and supplier relations can occur in multiple 
ways. First, there is learning about appropriate designs for certain situations. This is single loop 
learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978) in the sense that it is concerned with the question what design 
best fits what type of situation. In gathering such knowledge, learning curves can be extremely 
long, as the eventual effects of outsourcing and supplier relations may take one or multiple model   18 
life cycles to come into fruition, for instance because loss of engineering knowledge does not 
make  itself  felt  until  the  next  product  is  constructed.  Additionally,  learning  has  to  occur  in 
compliance with the particular institutional setting. The earlier Chrysler example revealed the 
path dependent nature of supplier relations. It is difficult to radically turn around such long-
standing  relations  in  a  pre-programmed  institutional  environment.  Second,  decision-making 
process and procedures themselves are repeated and such repetition may lead to improved future 
decision-making. This is double loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978), as it questions not the 
content  of  decisions  but  rather  how  they  are  reached.  This  type  of  learning  is  more  directly 
concerned with implementation of designs. 
One potential form of speeding up learning can be through knowledge spillovers between 
locations and units of an organization. By operating in multiple environments, firms can transfer 
outsourcing  and  supplier  knowledge  from  these  environments  across  borders,  similar  to 
knowledge  transfer  on  marketing  or  product  development.  Japanese  electronic  firms  have 
benefited from home-based knowledge when building transplants in the U.S. (Kenny and Florida, 
1995).  International knowledge exchange on the quality of suppliers can substantially reduce 
evaluation costs. Thus an active use of international sourcing networks can be a valuable format 
for learning how to outsource. A cross-functional exchange of knowledge can provide similar 
benefits.  A  firm  could  for  instance  reduce  the  margin  of  errors  when  making  outsourcing 
decisions by exchanging experiences between finance and IT specialists. The outsourcing of a 
helpdesk function and of a treasury function may be common in some respects, for example when 
it comes to supplier selection procedures and negotiation processes. Both cross-functional and 
cross-national  knowledge  exchange  can  increase  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the  firm  when  it 
comes  to  learning  how  to  outsource.  Yet  it  is  precisely  when  firms  want  to  learn  from   19 




In recent years a new relational perspective on interorganizational relations has emerged that 
explicitly recognizes that it is the joint activity of buyers and suppliers that leads to value-adding 
activities (Dyer and Singh, 1998). How effective outsourcing decisions will be, is partly going to 
depend on who the firm outsources to and on how well the outsourcing firm and its supplier work 
together. As stated before, the creation of rent-generating relations is very much a developmental 
process (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Various mechanisms have been identified that lower the 
cost of dyadic governance (Dyer and Singh, 1998): investing in relation-specific assets, building 
knowledge-sharing routines, possessing complementary resources and capabilities, and obtaining 
effective governance. Beyond dyadic governance, substantial attention has recently been paid to 
network level concepts. A single supplier relation is usually part of a larger network of relations, 
such that changes in one buyer-supplier relation will affect other relations. Such embeddedness 
on the one hand acts as a severe restriction on potential courses of action (Uzzi, 1996). It may, 
however, also enable new resource combinations within the network (Uzzi, 1997). 
The reach of the outsourcing firm’s social network and that of its manager determine the 
potential  range  of  suppliers.  There  are  costs  of  search  and  evaluation  attached  to  setting  up 
relations with suppliers (Webster and Wind, 1972). Evaluation costs of in particular are strongly 
modified by the extent of the social network of the firm and the decision-maker. For instance, IB 
research has demonstrated that over similar physical distances firms are much more likely to 
transact with suppliers within national boundaries than with suppliers across national boundaries 
(Rangan, 2000). Thus the extent of the firm’s and the manager’s actual network poses a limit on   20 
what governance designs a firm can implement and how effective it can be at implementing a 
given design. 
 
EXTERNAL SPAN OF CONTROL 
The  outsourcing  design  approach  as  it  has  been  discussed  provides  considerable  explanatory 
power for what designs firms ought to implement and probably substantial explanatory power for 
the designs they actually implement. Yet it tells us agonizingly little about how managers go 
about implementing such designs. Perhaps managers look for heuristics that help them avoid 
serious mistakes but also allow them to minimize their efforts. For instance when making  a 
decision on the introduction of a new model, they may take into account the interests of a few key 
suppliers,  but  ignore  those  of  other  suppliers  to  limit  the  complexity  of  decision-making, 
effectively limiting the implementation of the proper design to a few relations while ignoring 
others.  There  are  a  few  exceptions  that  discuss  not  only  design  but  also  implementation  or 
management (e.g. Bensaou, 1999) but these do not provide a general conceptual framework for 
understanding inter-firm differences in the capability to implement designs. The remainder of this 
paper is an attempt to outline such a general concept. This concept, as alluded to earlier, will be 
referred to as the external span of control, although it is the definition of the term more than its 
name that matters here. The focus will particularly be on mechanisms that generate differences 
between firms’ external span of control. 
Three strategies exist to alleviate managerial pressures on the external span of control: 
decreasing the number of suppliers; decreasing the average relationship intensity; improving the 
external span of control. All three strategies will now be discussed in the form of propositions. 
When it comes to improving the external span of control, one general note is that firms can also   21 
improve it by shifting more attention towards the outsourcing and supplier relations function 
through assigning a) more people to this function or b) improving the quality of the individuals 
assigned to it. Thus a relative shift of resources will lead to an improvement in the function. But 
like in a manager’s span of control diseconomies of scale will arise when a firm aims to directly 
manage all tiers of its supplier network and talented individuals are scarce and usually deployable 
in alternative settings. Therefore this type of growth is limited. More generally growth of the firm 
or  an  overall  improvement  of  employees’  competences  will  of  course  result  in  similar 
improvements  in  the  external  span  of  control.  External  span  of  control  will  further  be  co-
determined by the industry and country a firm operates in. Since, however, my interest is in 
differences between firms in a similar industry and country context, these determinants will not 
be discussed extensively. 
 
Decreasing Number of Suppliers  
Empirically speaking the trade of a large quantity of relations for a smaller number of more 
cooperative relations described earlier provides evidence that a firm cannot maintain too many 
channels simultaneously. Firms may have good reasons for limiting their number of suppliers. 
Having  more  suppliers  means  that  more  efforts  must  be  undertaken  to  communicate  market 
related information to suppliers, that smaller economies of scale in procurement can be obtained, 
that  more  information  must  be  exchanged  between  suppliers,  and  that  supply  chain  logistics 
become increasingly complicated. Presumably, firms will therefore continuously seek to get to 
the smallest possible number of external suppliers, in order to minimize coordination costs. 
On the other hand there also appears to be a lower bound on the number of suppliers, as 
few firms would want to rely on one and the same supplier for all their inputs since that takes 
away from the value delivered by suppliers. The general issue lying behind this decision is scale   22 
versus specialization. The eventual outcome of these opposite tensions will be some kind of 
compromise  between  large  scale  with  few  suppliers  and  specialization  with  many  suppliers. 
Firms benefit from having large suppliers through various kinds of scale economies. Yet they 
also benefit from having specialized suppliers in certain areas who help them capture more value 
and with whom they can set up long term and mutually beneficial relations. The key dimension 
determining the need for specialized suppliers is the architecture of the firm’s products. Complex 
products induce longer-term pressures to deal with a variety of inputs requiring the firm to deal 
with  multiple  actors  simultaneously  (Brusoni  et  al.,  2001).  Complex  products  require  more 
specialized  inputs  and  therefore  more  specialized  suppliers  rather  than  large-scale,  universal 
suppliers.  In  addition  it  may  be  useful  to  set  up  alternative  channels  for  key  inputs  through 
parallel sourcing, further raising the number of suppliers. 
When firms start operating in multiple countries through local services or manufacturing, it 
will often be hard to find one global supplier. Some items, including many services and JIT 
deliveries, cannot be transported across large distances while others have to be adapted to local 
market demand. Thus MNCs will often be forced to develop multiple supply structures to deal 
with the complexities associated with geography. Even though there has recently been a trend 
among some suppliers, like first-tier car suppliers, to locate where their customers are and thus 
allow their customers to buy from a single firm, the customer will still have to deal with multiple 
supply points at the operational level. Therefore being geographically dispersed poses another 
natural limit to lowering the number of external suppliers. 
 
Proposition  1:  Firms  can  increase  their  sourcing  effectiveness  by  lowering  the 
number  of  suppliers  in  their  portfolio,  until  the  cost  savings  this  generates  are   23 
outweighed  by  the  need  to  involve  multiple  suppliers  for  reasons  of  product 
complexity and geographical dispersion. 
 
Decreasing Average Relationship Intensity 
The portfolio approach (Dyer, Cho and Chu, 1998) referred to above is an indication that there is 
also a limit to the number of high quality, partnership-like relations. Normally firms will face the 
problem of how to improve relations with suppliers to maximize transaction value (Zajac and 
Olsen, 1993) but there are clear limits to such attempts as building and improving a relation is 
costly in itself. The process of building trust between partners is often painstaking and lengthy 
(Ring  and  Van  de  Ven,  1994),  which  is  problematic  when  expected  payoffs  are  limited.  In 
economics terms there will be a point at which the marginal cost of improving a relationship is 
greater than the marginal value that improvement delivers. Thus, paradoxically, under certain 
circumstances it may pay off to lower the extent of trust and co-operation in the relation with an 
existing supplier by reducing investments in that relation. This is for example the case when 
many new suppliers are added due to technological disruptions like the introduction of electronic 
devices  in  cars  or  airplanes  and  existing  supply  relations  become  less  important  due  to 
reprioritizing. Another case is when increased commoditization of certain inputs occurs, due to 
wider-spread knowledge of technologies. This is something the airline industry has engaged in 
when it started outsourcing programming activities to the Bangalore region. Both the underlying 
technology became more explicit, allowing for geographical disconnection, and a wider range of 
potential suppliers arose because the technology was taught more widely (i.e. in India formal 
training programs for computer programmers were introduced). As such there was less need on 
the part of the airlines to manage these activities intensely.   24 
Rather than naively  assuming firms always seek to build the most  cooperative relation 
possible, I therefore propose they will not want to do that, unless the circumstances are such that 
cooperative  relations  contribute  to  more  effective  operations  since  managers  will  want  to 
preserve their precious time and other resources. Thus, if the asset specificity of required inputs is 
low, arm’s length relations will commonly prevail just like in cases of limited uncertainty. As a 
general rule then, investments in intense relations will be directed to those places where they are 
perceived to be most useful. 
 
Proposition 2: Firms can increase their sourcing  effectiveness by decreasing the 
average extent of cooperation with suppliers, until the cost savings this generates are 
outweighed  by  the  need  to  use  specific  assets  for  producing  inputs  and  the 
behavioral uncertainty surrounding transactions. 
 
Competence Mechanism 
Sourcing  managers  need  to  be  concerned  with  the  question  whether  to  standardize 
communications  with  suppliers,  with  the  disadvantage  of  missing  richer  communication 
opportunities,  or  to  customize  them,  leading  to  more  investment  of  resources  like  time.  In 
addition they are the linking pins between the firm and its suppliers, which is an important link 
because knowledge is increasingly gathered and distributed among various partners in the supply 
chain.  As  such  they  need  to  invest  time  in  gathering  this  knowledge  from  suppliers  and 
disseminating it within the firm as well as gathering knowledge inside the firm and disseminating 
that to outside suppliers. Therefore their function, particularly in knowledge-intensive firms, is 
often not unlike that of account managers who act as linking pins to customers. The nature of the 
sourcing function is such that operational issues get tangled up with long term interests. Since   25 
sourcing is directly concerned with the supply chain and thus with a firm’s ability to deliver its 
products and services, any disruption must be dealt with immediately. A classic example of this is 
how  Toyota  used  its  long-term  goodwill  to  cover  short-term  capacity  problems  caused  by  a 
calamity (Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998). Therefore it is often easy to draw up strategic plans and 
designs involving joint development and innovation but these may and indeed often are crossed 
by operational concerns. Firms that deal effectively with both are a step ahead. 
Bensaou  (1999)  has  argued  that  creating  good  designs  to  match  internal  and  external 
conditions to appropriate supplier relations is one step of a competitive sourcing portfolio. The 
next step is to come up with managerial answers in terms of information sharing, the role of 
boundary  spanners,  and  the  appropriate  climate,  in  line  with  this  design  (Bensaou,  1999). 
Bensaou  (1999)  found  large  differences  between  organizations  in  their  ability  to  handle  the 
different types of designs. Firms appear to be specialized in or at least geared towards certain 
designs rather than others and there is empirical evidence to demonstrate there are differences 
between firms in the same industry and country with respect to their managerial profile. In other 
words, not every firm performs equally well with a certain design. Bensaou (1999) coined such 
misalignment overdesign and underdesign. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. automobile industry 
started to realize the potential benefits of buyer-supplier cooperation following the success of 
Japanese firms. Yet U.S. car makers have still not been completely successful in copying these 
designs (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000) because of their inability to switch designs. Presumably, there 
is substantial path dependence in building capabilities to manage certain types of designs.  If 
industry-wide change stimulates the adoption of different designs, firms will be stuck with their 
old managerial abilities. What types of relations a firm best manages will be co-determined by 
the imprinting conditions (Stinchcombe, 1965) of its founding period and location. Nishiguchi   26 
(1994) has sketched in great detail how the Japanese subcontracting system arose and evolved 
and how elements of the original system are still present in today’s subcontracting practices. 
 
Proposition  3:  Alignment  between  the  firm’s  historically  shaped  management 
capability for various types of supplier relations and its current supplier relations 
design positively modifies its external span of control. 
 
Learning Mechanism 
Through outsourcing, can firms learn how to outsource? There are indications this is indeed the 
case. Nike, as a classical example of outsourcing, is attributed a learning curve in its dealings 
with suppliers that allowed it to outsource ever more manufacturing activities and to outsource 
more effectively. Of course, even now Nike does not outsource all of its manufacturing. Thus 
previous experience allows a firm to make small adjustments to its outsourcing policies when 
implementing  them  and  produces  foresight  over  the  outcomes  of  supplier  relations.  In  short, 
experience produces learning and learning produces better decision-making abilities. Kale, Dyer 
and Singh (2002) have pointed at the importance of prior alliance experience in shaping a firm’s 
alliance capability. But the distinction discussed earlier between content learning and process 
learning implies that there may be different mechanisms at work here. In the context of alliances 
Reuer,  Zollo,  and  Singh  (2002)  discussed  how  technology  specific  experience  and  partner 
specific experience can have differential effects on the need to amend alliance agreements during 
the  implementation  phase.  While  technology  specific  experience  leads  to  fewer  amendments 
because of better initial agreements, partner specific  experience increases the need to amend 
agreements because initial agreements will be less detailed.   27 
One learning mechanism is where firms over time improve their insights into what are 
good and bad decisions. In other words, with increasing experience comes increasing insight into 
when outsourcing is appropriate and when it is not and under what conditions what particular 
type of supplier relation is most appropriate. Organizations that have outsourced previously may 
be  able  to  better  their  designs  over  time  by  learning  from  mistakes  since  failure  is  an 
underutilized source of learning (Levinthal and March, 1993). Since governance mistakes tend to 
be  costly  there  is  an  incentive  to  improve  designs  (Masten,  1993).  So  costly  mistakes  will 
eventually feed back into future decision-making, whether it is through an immediate response or 
because organizations are driven to the brink of extinction and activate their survival skills. Thus 
it  can  also  be  said  that  as  firms  outsource  more  intensely,  they  encounter  more  learning 
opportunities  implying  heavy  outsourcers  can  become  better  outsourcers.  Outsourcing  then 
becomes the standard mode of operations. Additionally there may be self selection processes in 
place  that  cause  firms  that  are  particularly  good  at  outsourcing  to  start  outsourcing  more, 
suggesting a reverse causality. Hence the causality of the relation between extent of outsourcing 
and span of control may be running in both directions. Where previous experience is concerned, 
such reverse causality will probably not exist. Previous experience gathered over time may be 
used to improve current decision-making. Managers that have erroneously outsourced in the past, 
are less likely  to promote current and future outsourcing  as it will undermine organizational 
performance  and  their  own  positions  within  the  organization.  Organizations  that  have 
experienced problems in executing Service Level Agreements with one IT supplier will be keener 
to hands-on manage an SLA with another supplier. Thus the length and frequency of the firm’s 
and  the  manager’s  experience  in  dealing  with  make-or-buy  decisions  and  supplier  design 
relations will co-determine the firm’s ability to implement such designs in the future. Gulati   28 
(1995)  discussed  how  prior  ties  positively  influence  the  likelihood  of  dealing  with the  same 
partner again. 
 
Proposition 4a: A firm’s extent of outsourcing positively modifies its external span 
of control. 
Proposition 4b: A firm’s experience in outsourcing and supplier relations positively 
modifies its external span of control. 
 
The  second  learning  mechanism,  then,  is  to  do  with  learning  how  to  make  outsourcing  and 
supplier  relations  decisions  and  implementing  them.  There  are  for  instance  issues  of  timing 
involved in terms of how often to make decisions, what is an appropriate time to start sharing 
certain information with suppliers, when do negative evaluations lead to termination of relations 
and a host of other possibilities to introduce formal mechanisms. As firms grow in size, so too 
does their supply base. Large manufacturing and service firms in particular are going to depend 
on  a  wide  range  of  suppliers.  It  is  now  widely  acknowledged  (Donaldson,  2001)  that  with 
increasing  size  comes  the  need  to  formalize  operations  if  a  firm  wishes  to  remain effective. 
Contingency theory states that sub-par performance results from an inability to fit the degree of 
formalization  to  the  size  of  the  firm  and  there  is  overwhelming  evidence  for  this  statement 
(Donaldson, 2001). Firms wishing to operate a wide range of suppliers will therefore need to 
formalize  decision-making  and  feedback  mechanisms  in  order  to  remain  effective.  In  the 
literature on alliances the use of a dedicated alliance function has been shown to lead to more 
effective decision-making (Kale et al., 2002). Kale et al. even maintain that a dedicated alliance 
function has a stronger impact than alliance experience as such. In a similar vein some type of 
centralized sourcing center where decision-making is coordinated may help a firm improve its   29 
ability to deal with outsourcing. A centralized sourcing center may for instance help in creating a 
collective memory but also by providing a symbolic presence to demonstrate the importance of 
outsourcing. More generally firms can use a wide variety of decision-making tools and structures 
to support their decision-making on outsourcing and supplier relations. One practical example of 
a decision-making tree that firms use when taking outsourcing decisions has been provided by 
Tayles and Drury (2001).  
 
Proposition  5:  The  use  of  formal  decision-making  and  feedback  tools  on 
outsourcing  and  supplier  selection  procedures  and  of  specialized  structures 
positively modifies the external span of control. 
 
Relational Mechanism 
Some of the learning due to previous action may not occur at the level of the firm, however. In 
fact  complicated  supply  chain  structures  like  the  Keiretsu  and  other  firm-centered  supply 
networks involve management at multiple levels (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). The extent 
to which the focal firm and its first tier supplier are able to develop joint understanding of the 
products and services they develop will translate into the effectiveness of the supply chain. For 
instance  when  a  first-tier  supplier  has,  through  building  joint  routines,  developed  a  better 
understanding of the focal firm’s requirements, it will be better able to manage its own (second-
tier) suppliers. Thus a snowballing effect will develop. Additionally the development of joint 
routines between the firm and its suppliers, will allow for quicker and possibly more effective 
communications, freeing time for undertaking other activities with the same supplier or other 
suppliers.  Inter-firm  learning  will  allow  a  firm  to  increase  its  external  span  of  control  and 
provides  the  opportunity  to  add  to  the  number  of  suppliers  or  increase  the  average  relation   30 
intensity. Yet in order to be able to replicate a previous experience with other suppliers it is 
necessary  to  develop  particularly  strong,  iconic  examples.  For  Toyota,  its  relation  with 
Nippondenso is a well-documented icon of a partnering buyer-supplier relation that Toyota can 
relate to when building relations with other suppliers. 
  In  supply  networks  that  are  more  tightly  knit  more  spillovers  of  knowledge  and 
innovation occur. Embedded networks arise because of commonalities and associations between 
network members (Uzzi, 1996). Knowledge is bound to travel more freely and more swiftly in an 
embedded network (Uzzi, 1996). Where associations between network members are completely 
absent there is a need to set n 1:1 communication channels. Where associations are complete one 
1:n  channel  suffices.  This  implies  there  is  room  for  economizing  when  some  degree  of 
association exists. As firms seek to implement relational designs, it will be beneficial if at least 
some of that implementation takes on a repetitive character because if partners are similar such 
repetition  will  lower  implementation  costs  or  increase  implementation  effectiveness.  The 
associational  character  of  embedded  networks  further  promotes  implementation  ability  as 
information pertaining to one implementation will spillover to another implementation. Therefore 
embeddedness of networks will promote the realization of numerous and cooperative supplier 
relations. The need to manage strong and embedded supplier ties will therefore co-evolve with 
the ability to do so. 
 
Proposition  6:  The  strength  of  a  firm’s  supplier  ties  and  their  embeddedness 
positively modifies its external span of control. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS   31 
In recent years many practitioners and authors have rightfully pointed at the potential benefits of 
both outsourcing and cooperative IORs. A substantial literature has arisen to describe the best 
design for outsourcing and supplier relations. However, finding the appropriate design given firm 
and transaction characteristics is a necessary but not a sufficient step towards an effective supply 
chain. The main point made in this paper is that not all firms are equally effective at managing 
outsourcing and supplier relations because there is variation in the external span of control among 
firms. Therefore the benefits some firms accrue from a given design may be small or could even 
be negative. I have demonstrated that firms cannot manage unlimited numbers of cooperative 
relations effectively. Attempts to do so will cause an overstretching of the span of control and 
large and rising coordination costs. Realizing there is such a limit and dealing with it accordingly 
will increase the effectiveness of sourcing. From a conceptual point of view the external span of 
control can be thought of as an additional explanation of dynamic firm behavior in outsourcing 
and supplier relations. For instance an under utilization of the external span of control provides 
slack  for  additional  outsourcing.  I  discussed  how  limiting  the  number  of  suppliers  and 
minimizing cooperation are two possible strategies to limit coordination costs. Both, however, are 
limited by the presence of moderating factors, implying that to improve the external span of 
control is often a more viable strategy. 
  I then moved on to discuss three mechanisms that help understand how the external span 
of control can be improved. The competence mechanism was first used to illustrate how firms 
specialize in certain types of relations and are therefore not equally effective in implementing 
designs.  Effective  implementation  was  shown  to  be  dependent  on  the  extent  of  alignment 
between the firm’s relational profile and its relational designs. Using the learning mechanism the 
role of experience, outsourcing intensity, and formal feedback mechanisms was reviewed. All of 
these feed in to the external span of control and are potential methods of improving it. Finally, I   32 
used the relational mechanism to investigate how embedded relations and strong ties may serve 
as ways to improve the external span of control. 
  In response to the point made by Barney (1999) that firm capabilities affect where firm 
boundaries will be, the issue taken up here is that a firm also has a capability in managing around 
these  boundaries.  Recent  governance  literature  (e.g.  Leiblein,  2003)  has  initiated  integration 
attempts  of  firm  level  capabilities  and  transaction  level  considerations  suggesting  they  are 
mutually dependent concepts. The external span of control is a natural bridge between these 
concepts since it is a firm level capability influencing transaction level performance outcomes. In 
terms of the ‘past-present-future’ approach forwarded by Leiblein and Miller (2003), external 
span of control is the historically determined ability of firms to economize on current transaction 
choices, while it also presents a path dependent platform for growth that co-determines future 
performance outcomes. Hence the costs and value of any given transaction are partly determined 
exogenously. Competitive advantage may arise from the degree to which firms are able to fit firm 
level capabilities with transaction level characteristics. 
  Obviously there are some limitations attached to the concept of external span of control as 
well as its treatment here. First, the claim is made that the external span of control provides an 
additional explanation to variance in sourcing effectiveness but it is unclear how much variance it 
actually explains. Perhaps the effect of implementation abilities is dwarfed by the effect of a 
governance mismatch, the effect of which is thought to be substantial (Leiblein et al., 2002; 
Masten, 1993). This is an issue that can ultimately only be resolved through empirical testing. 
What is clear though is that we cannot automatically assume mere managerial ignorance is at the 
heart of a failure by Nissan to match Toyota. In other words, implementation differences should 
not  simply  be  ignored.  Second,  external  span  of  control  was  defined  in  this  paper  but  not 
operationalized to the fullest extent possible. This is an important step that should precede future   33 
testing. The key means to empirically measure external span of control would be to identify the 
gap  between  intended  and  realized  design  since  that  describes  a  firm’s  ability  to  actually 
implement what it believes to be the best design. Then a firm’s sourcing effectiveness could be 
simultaneously linked to its chosen design, including how that design measures up against the 
antecedents the firm operated under like asset specificity, and its implemented design, taking into 
account that there is a gap between the intended and realized designs. Such a procedure would 
allow researchers to clearly separate between various phases of the process. But perhaps it is 
necessary to identify multiple components to the concept that behave in different ways. Finally, 
there is bound to be an important interface between the design and implementation phases, which 
was not discussed here in order to simplify the discussion somewhat and to provide a starker 
contrast  between  the  two  phases.  For  instance,  when  making  a  design  decision,  smart  firms 
probably  take  into  account  their  ability  to  implement  that  design.  In  that  sense,  supposed 
governance mismatches could turn out to be a consequence of foresight about a firm’s inability to 
implement the ‘right’ governance design. Perhaps US carmakers have never bothered to fully 
copy  the  Toyota  system  because  they  knew  they  would  not  be  particularly  successful  in 
implementing it. Design and implementation could interact. Clearly this is an issue that warrants 
additional treatment. 
The propositions forwarded in this paper are in dire need of empirical scrutiny. Such 
testing, I suggest, should start with small scale, qualitative work rather than large scale empirical 
testing. A multiple case study within one industry and country in which variance is sought in 
firms’  external  span  of  control  could  be  worthwhile.  Finding  good  or  best  practices  is  one 
possible step in this process, although highlighting particular best practices in one type of relation 
might not be the way forward. Reverting again to Toyota, it has been shown to be particularly 
good  at  cooperative  relations,  but  like  any  firm  it  must  also  engage  in  some  arm’s  length   34 
relations. Is Toyota just as effective as GM in those relations or perhaps more or less effective? A 
threat by Toyota to abandon its supplier might be viewed with less fear than a similar action by 
GM because it holds less credibility. By addressing the whole set or portfolio of relationships, 
rather than just one type, such differences should come to the fore. Perhaps the car industry, 
particularly in Japan, will again prove to be a fruitful ground for empirical work. A mere re-
reading of abundant existing empirical evidence from the angle of implementation rather than 
design might generate some interesting findings. Yet it would be equally important to extend the 
testing ground to less familiar industries like financial services. 
As a further extension the concept of external span of control can perhaps also be used in 
the context of other external relations, like those with joint venture partners, although that was 
obviously not the goal of this paper. From a managerial point of view the external span of control 
is a capability to be  guarded and developed further. The way in which to do that obviously 
depends upon the firm’s future objectives. If firms seek to move away from commodity markets 
they need to upgrade the internal management of external relations accordingly, to ensure there is 
enough capacity to manage the required supplier relations. Alternatively, a firm’s environment 
may force it to outsource more activities to cut costs, in which case the need arises to manage a 
large number of perhaps diverse suppliers. Under such circumstances the emphasis should be on 
routinization of coordination activities to minimize transaction costs. Managerial foresight can 
produce fit between the firm’s capabilities and the characteristics of the transactions it engages in. 
In either case, firms can acquire competitive advantage by bettering their ability to implement 
their sourcing designs.    35 
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